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Hobbes: A new decade is coming up.
Calvin: Yeah, big deal! Hmph. Where are the flying cars?
Where are the moon colonies? Where are the per-
sonal robots and the zero gravity boot, uh? You
call this a new decade?! You call this the future??
HA! Where are the rocket packs? Where are the
disintegration rays? Where are the floating cities?
Hobbes: Frankly, I’m not sure people have the brains to
manage the technology they’ve got. 
Calvin:  I mean, look at this! We still have the weather?!
Give me a break!
Calvin, the feckless creation of the cartoonist genius Bill
Watterson, is a six-year old boy with an overactive imagina-
tion, and Hobbes is his constant companion. To everyone
else, Hobbes is a stuffed tiger; to Calvin, he appears as a real
tiger, with a philosophical bent that matches his namesake.
Calvin’s complaint, voiced in a comic strip more than ten
years ago, was echoed a number of years later by several
pundits when the millennium turned. Reporter Cindy Gier-
hart, in an article entitled “Where are the flying cars?: The
future that didn’t come true”, cited a 1967 Wall Street
Journal book,  Here Comes Tomorrow!, that predicted a
variety of new technologies for the dawn of the twenty-first
century, including trains that moved through air-cushioned
tubes at up to 600 miles per hour, a manned Mars landing,
and of course, the inevitable flying cars. Yet here we are, in
2003, still commuting to work on outmoded rail systems
(misnamed rapid transit), or via ‘sport-utility vehicles’ so
unaerodynamic that they couldn’t fly if they had a rocket
engine strapped to their rear bumpers. 
Futurologists are always being taken to task for their overly
optimistic predictions, but the authors of Here Comes
Tomorrow! didn’t do so badly on some counts. One of their
predictions was for a worldwide communications system
that would transmit vast amounts of information at enor-
mous speeds - this in 1967, when the Internet was not even a
gleam in anybody’s eye. And they predicted that parents
would be able to choose the sex of their child through artifi-
cial insemination, although they missed the magnitude of the
ethical dilemmas that reproductive technology brought with it.
Yet Calvin’s complaint lingers. Why, after less than two cen-
turies of almost incomprehensible technological progress -
remember that until the mid-nineteenth century no human
had ever traveled faster on land than a horse, and no one had
ever traveled through the air or under the water at all - has
progress in so many areas seemed to slow almost to a halt. We
don’t travel any faster now than we did in the mid-twentieth
century; in fact, if you live in a major metropolitan area, the
odds are that most of the time, thanks to traffic, you travel
slower than you could have done fifty years ago. After a series
of costly failures, we are probably further from sending a
manned expedition to Mars than we appeared to be in the
late 1960s. We’re certainly further from moon colonies: the
costs have ballooned beyond expectation. Personal robots
exist, but as no more than expensive, largely useless toys. And
there are no flying cars. In nearly all the science fiction novels
of the mid-twentieth century, and most of the science fiction
films, the skies of the twenty-first century were filled with
flying cars. Where are the flying cars?
It’s actually pretty easy to account for some of the seeming
lapses of technological progress. Space exploration became
too costly, in men and materials, to justify expeditions that
could be done more safely and cheaply by unmanned craft.
Public transportation in many developed countries became a
poor stepsister to automobiles, although there are signs that
this trend, which was driven in part by human laziness and
desire for independence and in part by aggressive lobbying by
the oil and automotive industries, may be ripe for change. As
for the absence of flying cars, well, I think that’s the easiest of
all to explain. Like all urbanites everywhere in the world I am
firmly convinced that my city has the worst drivers on the
planet, and if they were given access to flying cars it would beraining automobile parts. I suspect that we have actually had
the technology to produce flying cars for twenty years but
that it’s been suppressed for reasons of public safety, and as a
Boston driver all I can say is, it’s a good thing. 
And yet, for me Calvin’s rant resonates in another technol-
ogy-driven sector, that of publicly funded scientific research.
What he was saying, after all, is that he was disappointed
that scientific progress hadn’t lived up to its promises. He
was wrong, of course, because what he was really complain-
ing about was the absence of things largely forecast by
science fiction, not science, and science fiction has the habit
of making exaggerated promises about the future. But in
recent years, biology has also started making big promises
about the future in order to justify big increases in public
funding, and there are signs that this habit is having serious
negative consequences. 
It all started, I think, with the War on Cancer, proclaimed by
U.S. president Richard Nixon in the early 1970s. I don’t think
increasing public funding for cancer research was itself a bad
idea, but I hated the way it was done (see Genome Biology
2001, 2:comment1007.1-1007.2 for more on this issue). First
of all, the title of the campaign conveyed the misleading
impression that “cancer” was one disease, and therefore that
there should be one cure, a fallacy that the scientific estab-
lishment did too little to refute. Second, the whole notion that
all we needed to do to solve any major health problem was to
throw buckets of money at it ignored the reality that different
fields are at very different stages of development, and benefit
in very different ways - and sometimes not at all - from injec-
tions of funding. Finally, I thought at the time that a cancer
war would give the public an overly optimistic idea not only
about what publicly supported science could accomplish but
also about how rapidly it would accomplish it. Of course,
thirty years later, the ‘war’ has not been won - indeed as
described then it never could have been - and no one speaks
of it now. Some very important breakthroughs have been
made in understanding cancer in general and in treating a
small number of cancers, in particular, but perhaps an
equally significant outcome was a rise in the number, and
influence, of disease activists, who have contributed, among
much good, to a proliferation of disease-oriented ‘directed’
research initiatives, which are slowly siphoning resources
from basic, individual-investigator-initiated, curiosity-driven
science. And although there is abundant evidence that basic
research has significant long-term payoffs, I have never seen
an independent study of how effective government-funded
applied research is in the biomedical sciences, an issue of par-
ticular significance given that at least some of it supports
efforts that are amateur versions of the privately-funded
research already being carried out by biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies. 
I remember the rush of promises made when the gene for
cystic fibrosis was identified. More than ten years later, it is
not clear that knowing about this gene has contributed sig-
nificantly to the life expectancy of a single patient. Now I am
one of those who believe that some day it will, but history
suggests that, unfortunately, some day is probably going to
be a long way off. And there were few voices saying that
when the gene was discovered. Gene therapy in general is an
area where promises of miracles around the corner have
been trumpeted. I remember being at a meeting where a
respected scientist predicted - his flying cars as it turned out
- that by the early years of the present century the drug of
choice for most diseases would be a gene, and pharmaceuti-
cals as we knew them would be on the way out. Several
patient deaths later, most biotech companies, including
several genomics companies, are scrambling to learn how to
develop not gene therapies but those outmoded pharmaceu-
ticals. Yet still it seems that every new ‘breakthrough’ is her-
alded as taking us to the brink of a cure for this or the way to
prevent that. 
Genomics hasn’t helped counter this trend. The Human
Genome Initiative showed that a big, targeted research
project could garner huge governmental support, in no small
part because it had a well-defined goal that was easy to
explain to public officials. And so the effort to sequence the
human genome has spawned programs to define the human
proteome, and to determine the three-dimensional struc-
tures of all of the gene products in various organisms, and
several other imitators. The rationale behind some of these
initiatives seems to me as thin as the following: if the
genome-sequencing people got theirs, then why can’t I have
mine? Bad enough that data gathering for its own sake -
which I in no way condemn per se, I merely wish it to be in
its proper place - threatens to become more highly valued
than hypothesis-driven research. But more dangerous still is
the hype that is used to sell such projects to the public and to
public officials. 
When the US National Institutes of Health was considering
starting the Structural Genomics Initiative about five years
ago, it convened several meetings to see what members of
the scientific community thought about the idea. At one of
them a well-known structural biologist stated that in his
opinion the project couldn’t possibly be oversold. He was old
enough to remember the War on Cancer, but evidently he
didn’t, or didn’t think the same risks applied to this project,
from which he stood to benefit. And in due course the
project was approved, and millions of dollars were poured
into a number of consortia that each promised to deliver
hundreds of protein crystal structures per year, with the goal
of rapidly filling out the catalog of known protein folds and
providing functional information via these structures for
many of the genes of unknown function that were turning up
in the genome-sequencing projects. 
The first round of funding for these consortia is now being
reviewed, and I suspect that many, if not all, of the consortia
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Not one is yet close to the kind of high-throughput that was
promised originally. The low-hanging fruit, in terms of
protein folds, seem to have been picked pretty thoroughly
already, and the number of structures that have to be deter-
mined to find a novel fold is increasing, making the comple-
tion of the catalog subject to the law of diminishing returns.
And the deduction of function from structure is turning out
to be about as hard as the deduction of function from
sequence, because the coupling between fold and function is
not all that tight for many protein folds. I personally think
there are sound scientific reasons to fund the Structural
Genomics Initiative, but they are very different from those
used to ‘sell’ it. I think a systematic effort to obtain a huge
number of protein structures rapidly will lead to big
advances in structure-determining technology, will provide
an ensemble of structures of great utility for drug design,
and will provide valuable information about how protein
structure and function change during evolution. Those ought
to be reasons enough, but instead the project was, I believe,
oversold, and now there is a danger that the funding agen-
cies and their constituencies may lose faith in it. 
Much of the process of hyping new initiatives stems from a
belief on the part of scientists that the lay public, and their
elected officials, do not understand the value of research and
need to be persuaded to support it by a steady diet of good
news and promises. I think this attitude sells the public
short: they’re sophisticated enough to appreciate that basic
research is a sound long-term investment. After the dotcom
bubble, I don’t believe that such an investment needs to be
camouflaged with exaggerated promises of big short-term
returns. “Underpromise but overdeliver”, my mother used to
tell me. I think that’s good advice in many aspects of life, but
especially nowadays in science. If we don’t want those who
support us to sound like Calvin, we’d better either start fol-
lowing that advice, or hope that the general public heeds the
title words of a song by the rap group Public Enemy: “Don’t
Believe the Hype.”
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